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 The law regulates family life in a number of ways (Har-
ris & Teitelbaum, 2000), ranging from its formation (mar-
riage) to its expansion (children) and dissolution (divorce). 
One of the more contentious debates in this arena concerns is-
sues of parent-child confl ict, and the rhetoric grows particular-
ly heated when the child in question has not yet been born.1 
The most salient and highly publicized aspect of this debate 
is, of course, women’s right to have an abortion (see general-
ly Bartlett & Harris, 1998, chap. 6B). Recently, however, the 
state has also sought to regulate the confl ict between mothers 
and fetuses by attempting to control, through civil and crimi-
nal sanctions, pregnant women’s use of substances that might 
harm the fetus (e.g., Bell, 2001; Hodge, 1999). 
Advocates on both sides of this issue agree that “there can 
be no serious dispute that once a woman has chosen to bear 
a child, the government has a legitimate interest in pursu-
ing policies that will improve the likelihood her baby will be 
healthy” (Johnsen, 1992, p. 570). Nonetheless, policies that re-
quire drug testing, and possibly prosecuting, pregnant women 
raise serious issues regarding women’s constitutional rights. 
The leading reproductive-rights cases (e.g., Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1992; Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 1965; Roe v. Wade, 1973) focus on pregnant 
women’s right to privacy, as an element of substantive due 
process, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Policies 
governing drug use during pregnancy have added a new con-
stitutional wrinkle by potentially infringing on pregnant wom-
en’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure, as guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, such policies have 
signifi cant legal implications, as well as some obvious (and 
perhaps not so obvious) implications for pregnant women’s 
behavior. This article reviews the Supreme Court’s most re-
cent decision on the matter and discusses these implications. 
The Supreme Court’s Latest Word on Pregnancy 
and the Constitution
The U.S. Supreme Court’s latest decision affecting pregnant 
women’s rights was handed down in March 2001 (Ferguson v. 
City of Charleston [hereinafter “Ferguson”], 2001). Between 
1989 and 1994, 253 obstetrical patients, who were receiving 
prenatal treatment at a public hospital operated by the Medical 
University of South Carolina (MUSC), tested positive for co-
caine in tests of their urine that were given as part of their treat-
ment; 30 of them were arrested (Annas, 2001). The tests were 
conducted by hospital personnel as a means of inducing pa-
tients to obtain treatment to minimize harm to the fetus. 
The policy, which was developed in consultation with po-
lice, (a) established procedures for identifying and testing 
pregnant patients suspected of drug use; (b ) required that a 
chain of custody be followed when obtaining and testing urine 
samples; (c) provided for education and treatment referral for 
patients who tested positive;. (d) contained guidelines for ar-
rested patients who tested positive; and (e) prescribed prose-
cutions for drug offenses (possession and/or distribution) or 
child neglect, depending on the stage of pregnancy. Child ne-
glect prosecutions were predicated on South Carolina’s recog-
nition that a viable fetus is a person for legal purposes (Whit-
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ner v. State [hereinafter “Whitner”], 1997). Ferguson differs 
from the majority of cases in which pregnant women have 
been prosecuted for using drugs because the plaintiffs object-
ed to the policy underlying the drug testing itself and not to 
the subsequent prosecution. 
The plaintiffs/petitioners in Ferguson were 10 of the pa-
tients who were arrested. These patients sued the hospital, 
individual medical personnel, the city of Charleston, and law 
enforcement offi cials who helped develop and implement 
the policy, in a $3 million class-action lawsuit. They sued 
on the grounds that testing for drugs and turning the results 
over to police for possible prosecution violated their Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, 
that medical personnel committed the tort of abuse of pro-
cess in administration of the policy, and that the policy dis-
criminated against minority women (the racial discrimina-
tion issue is treated more extensively elsewhere; see Logan, 
1999; Roberts, 1991). The federal district court found for the 
defendants on all claims, and the plaintiffs appealed (Fergu-
son v. City of Charleston, 1999). 
The principal issue on review was “whether the interest in 
using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant wom-
en from using cocaine can justify a departure from the general 
rule that an offi cial nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if 
not authorized by a valid warrant” (Ferguson, 2001, p. 1284). 
Respondents’ defense was twofold: fi rst, that as a matter of 
fact, petitioners had consented to the searches, and second, 
that as a matter of law, the searches were reasonable, even if 
they were unconsented, because they were justifi ed by “spe-
cial needs.” The district court rejected the second defense be-
cause the searches were not done by the hospital for indepen-
dent purposes, but it submitted the factual defense to the jury, 
which found for respondents. The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affi rmed, but without reaching the question of consent; 
rather, the appellate court held that the searches were reason-
able as a matter of law under the “special needs” doctrine 
(Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 1999). On appeal, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
The decision contained a majority opinion authored by 
Justice Stevens, a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy that 
raised a number of important issues, and a dissenting opin-
ion fi led by Justice Scalia, joined (in part) by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 
Majority Opinion
The majority held that (a) the urine tests were search-
es within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and (b) the 
tests, and subsequent reporting of positive results to the police, 
were unreasonable searches absent patients’ consent. Likening 
the patients’ situation to cases where employees have provid-
ed urine samples for drug screening (e.g., Chandler v. Mill-
er, 1997; Griffi n v. Wisconsin [hereinafter “Griffi n”], 1987; 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association [hereinafter 
“Skinner”], 1989; Treasury Employees v. Von Raab [hereinaf-
ter “Von Raab”], 1989; Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 
[hereinafter “Acton”], 1995), the Court argued that “we have 
routinely treated urine screens taken by state agents as search-
es within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though 
the results were not reported to the police” (Ferguson, 2001, 
p. 1287, note 9). For example, the Court has held that blood 
and urine testing of railroad employees following train acci-
dents is a search (Skinner, 1989), as is the urinalysis of school 
athletic participants (Acton, 1995). Thus, MUSC’s drug test-
ing procedures “were indisputably searches within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment” (Ferguson, 2001, p. 1287). 
The heart of the decision lies in the second part of the 
holding: that the searches were unreasonable. A search and 
seizure that would otherwise be unreasonable is allowed if the 
state can show a “special need” apart from a general interest 
in crime control (e.g., Acton, 1995; Griffi n, 1987; New Jer-
sey v. T.L.O. [hereinafter “T.L.O.”], 1985). A search need not 
be supported by either a warrant or probable cause “in those 
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and prob-
able-cause requirement impracticable” (T.L.O., 1985, p. 748). 
Under the special-needs doctrine, several cases involving 
suspicionless drug testing have been upheld involving em-
ployees (Skinner, 1989; Von Raab, 1989), students (Acton, 
1995; T.L.O., 1985), and probationers (Griffi n, 1987). The re-
spondents in Ferguson (2001) sought to justify their search on 
the same grounds, arguing that the need to protect the health of 
both mothers and children justifi ed the invasion of petitioners’ 
privacy. However, the majority held that the “special needs” 
here did not outweigh the invasion of petitioners’ privacy, for 
two principal reasons. First, the invasion of the MUSC pa-
tients’ privacy was more substantial than in the other special-
needs cases. In the other cases, “there was no misunderstand-
ing about the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test 
results, and there were protections against the dissemination 
of the results to third parties” (Ferguson, 2001, p. 1288). For 
example, the students in Acton (1995) knew why their urine 
was being tested, and the results were disclosed only to a lim-
ited class of school personnel—they were not turned over to 
the police or used for any internal disciplinary function. The 
invasion of the Ferguson petitioners’ privacy was greater be-
cause they did not know that the test results would be dissem-
inated to third parties. 
The second reason why the majority found that the special-
needs test failed was the nature of the special need, which in Fer-
guson (2001) differed from that typically asserted as justifi cation 
for a warrantless search. In the earlier cases, “the ‘special need’ 
that was advanced as a justifi cation for the absence of a warrant 
or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State’s 
general interest in law enforcement” (Ferguson, 2001, p. 1289). 
For example, in Skinner (1989), the tests were designed “not to 
assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather ‘to prevent ac-
cidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from im-
pairment of employees by alcohol or drugs’” (p. 1415). In Fer-
guson (2001), on the other hand, “the central and indispensable 
feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law en-
forcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment” 
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(p. 1290). The police were heavily involved in designing the 
policy, and the results could be, and in many cases were, used 
in criminal prosecutions on drug or child neglect charges. In 
other words, the searches served no “special” need of the state 
but merely the state’s general interest in reducing drug use and 
abuse. As a result, the majority held the following: 
Given the primary purpose of the Charleston program, 
which was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in 
order to force women into treatment, and given the ex-
tensive involvement of law enforcement offi cials at every 
stage of the policy, this case simply does not fi t within 
the closely guarded category of “special needs.” (Fergu-
son, 2001, p. 1292) 
Concurrence
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is informative be-
cause although he agreed that the hospital’s policy was un-
constitutional, he also suggested away to make such a policy 
pass constitutional muster: 
As the Court holds, the hospital acted, in some respects, 
as an institutional arm of law enforcement for purposes 
of the policy. Under these circumstances [italics added], 
while the policy may well have served legitimate needs 
unrelated to law enforcement, it had as well a penal char-
acter with a far greater connection to law enforcement 
than other searches sustained under our special needs ra-
tionale. (Ferguson, 2001, p. 1294) 
In particular, he stressed that the special needs requirement could 
be satisfi ed by having less police involvement in designing the 
policy and more of a therapeutic than a crime-control purpose. 
In essence, Justice Kennedy is saying that a testing policy 
designed by the hospital on its own (i.e., without police assis-
tance), for the express (and not merely the ostensible) purpose 
of aiding pregnant women and their unborn children, would be 
acceptable. Importantly, under such a “benign” policy, it would 
still be permissible for hospital personnel to turn positive results 
over to police for possible prosecution. He concluded that
We must accept the premise that the medical profession 
can adopt acceptable criteria for testing expectant moth-
ers for cocaine use in order to provide prompt and effec-
tive counseling to the mother and to take proper medical 
steps to protect the child. If prosecuting authorities then 
adopt legitimate procedures to discover this information 
and prosecution follows, that ought not to invalidate the 
testing. (Ferguson, 2001, p. 1295, italics added) 
In other words, one arm of the state (prosecutors) may 
piggyback its law-enforcement interests onto another arm 
of the state’s (public hospitals) special need, as long as the 
hospitals did not know beforehand that, or how, prosecutors 
would use the information. 
Dissent
Although the jury instructions at trial expressly required 
a verdict in favor of petitioners unless the jury found that they 
had consented, neither the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals nor 
the Supreme Court majority addressed the issue of consent. The 
Court of Appeals held that consent was irrelevant because the 
state’s special need justifi ed a search, even an unconsented one, 
whereas the Supreme Court majority assumed that the tests were 
performed without the patients’ informed consent and thereby 
found that the special need did not justify an unconsented search. 
Thus, unlike the trial court, neither reviewing court found the is-
sue of consent to be an important basis for its decision. 
Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist), on the other hand, found consent to be central to 
the question of the search’s constitutionality. The dissenting 
opinion is important because, like Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence, it lays the groundwork for potentially upholding simi-
lar testing policies in the future. According to the dissent, the 
heart of the consent issue is the question of to what, exactly, 
petitioners consented. They clearly consented to provide the 
urine specimens. However, it is unclear whether they were in-
formed that the tests of the urine would include drug testing, 
and they almost certainly were not told that positive test re-
sults would be reported to the police. The jury instructions re-
ferred only to this fi rst level of consent, the taking of the spec-
imens. According to Justice Scalia, if the patients consented to 
the taking of the specimens, then it follows that they also con-
sented to any conceivable use of the specimens. 
His reasoning is based on a line of cases involving the use 
of lawful, but deceptive, means of obtaining material for purpos-
es other than those represented by the authorities (e.g., Hoffa v. 
United States, 1966; Illinois v. Perkins, 1990). The leading case 
in this area, Hoffa v. United States (1966), held that “the Fourth 
Amendment [does not protect] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief 
that a person to whom he voluntarily confi des his wrongdoing 
will not reveal it” (p. 413). In other words, as long as a defendant 
voluntarily provides access to some evidence, there is no reason-
able expectation of privacy to invade. Applied to the facts in Fer-
guson (2001), this would mean that by voluntarily providing the 
urine sample, the petitioners also (unknowingly) consented to its 
subsequent use against them in criminal proceedings. 
Under this approach, because the entire search was rea-
sonable, “the special-needs doctrine is thus quite irrelevant, 
since it operates only to validate searches and seizures that 
are otherwise unlawful” (Ferguson, 2001, p. 1299). Moreover, 
Justice Scalia fi nds no difference between the MUSC policy 
and other circumstances—upheld as constitutional—in which 
health care professionals are ethically or legally required to 
disclose information concerning a patient’s crime that they 
encounter in the course of ordinary medical procedures (see, 
e.g., Annas, 2001; Hall, 1985). 
Creating a Constitutionally Acceptable Testing Policy
The opinion leaves an important issue unresolved: Is a pol-
icy like that of the MUSC hospital unconstitutional per se, or 
could such a policy be modifi ed so as to make it acceptable to 
the courts? 
As one commentator noted, “Substance abuse by pregnant 
women is not so much a criminological problem, but rather a 
public health dilemma” (Brody & McMillin, 2001; see also 
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Howell, Heiser, & Harrington, 1999). Despite the Ferguson 
(2001) decision, the magnitude of the public health issues in-
volved is likely to produce considerable pressure on states to 
develop a constitutionally acceptable procedure for testing, and 
potentially prosecuting, pregnant women for drug use. Evi-
dence that the issue is not simply going to go away comes from 
several sources. A few state legislatures have attempted to pass 
legislation criminalizing prenatal drug use, and at least one state 
(Massachusetts) has successfully enacted such a statute (Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 119, § 51A, 1990). When drug use during 
pregnancy is not an independent crime, women have been pros-
ecuted for child abuse, neglect, vehicular homicide, encour-
aging the delinquency of a minor, involuntary manslaughter, 
drug traffi cking or delivery of a controlled substance, failure to 
provide child support, and assault with a deadly weapon (Lo-
gan, 1999). As of 1992, 24 states had brought criminal charg-
es against women for using illicit drugs while pregnant (Logan, 
1999). In addition, some states provide for civil sanctions, such 
as the involuntary commitment of pregnant women who appear 
intoxicated or who fail to complete substance abuse treatment 
(Brody & McMillin, 2001; Roberts, 1991). 
As of 1999, at least 13 states required public hospitals 
to test pregnant women who were suspected of drug abuse, 
with the results reported to social services or the police (Lo-
gan, 1999). Prior to the Ferguson (2001) decision, offi cials 
from South Carolina—the state that has gone to the greatest 
lengths in protecting the unborn from maternal drug use—
“state[d] that they [would] fi nd a way to continue the poli-
cy, no matter how the Court rules” (Bell, 2001, p. 657, citing 
a segment from Nightline: “How Far Can You Go to Pro-
tect an Unborn Child?” ABC television broadcast, Septem-
ber 27, 2000). It therefore seems clear that pregnant wom-
en will be subject to similar policies in the future. Is there a 
way for states to make such policies constitutional? As dis-
cussed above, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence articulated one 
criterion—a bona fi de special need, to which law enforce-
ment is clearly secondary—necessary for a policy similar to 
the one employed by MUSC to be constitutional. The ma-
jority’s opinion implied several other conditions that would 
also be desirable, if not necessary , for the Supreme Court to 
fi nd such a policy acceptable: private agents, explicit con-
sent, and the elimination of discretionary testing. 
The majority stated that “because MUSC is a state hospi-
tal, the members of its staff are government actors, subject to 
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment” (Ferguson, 2001, p. 
1287). By implication, a private hospital—as a nongovernmen-
tal entity—would not be subject to the same Fourth Amend-
ment restrictions. For instance, a religious hospital that received 
no state funds could test its patients for drugs, without their 
consent, and turn the results over to the police. Although such a 
scenario is theoretically possible, it is highly improbable. Very 
few hospitals these days are entirely free of governmental fund-
ing. Additionally, even hospitals that do not receive direct gov-
ernmental support must invariably receive indirect funding, in 
the form of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, which the 
government could use to hold them to certain guidelines, such 
as rules against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, it 
would seem to make little difference, practically speaking, that 
MUSC is formally a state-funded institution. 
Two procedural variations could still increase the chance 
of a hospital’s successfully implementing a drug-testing poli-
cy. First, the policy could require that patients explicitly con-
sent to giving the police access to their test results. Making 
patients aware of the adverse use to which their test results 
might be put would almost certainly lead some patients not 
to seek prenatal care (see below), thereby defeating the pur-
pose of having the policy in the fi rst place. Nonetheless, some 
patients would likely be so desirous of care, or confi dent that 
their test results would be negative, that they would contin-
ue to receive prenatal care even though it entailed providing 
a urine specimen for testing and possible prosecution. Under 
these circumstances, some women who wished to beat their 
addiction but were unable to do so might even consent to test-
ing as a “cry for help,” in order to commit themselves to main-
taining better prenatal health under the threat of prosecution. 
Second, although Ferguson (2001) does not say so specif-
ically, a less discretionary policy would almost certainly fare 
better on review. Because hospital personnel used nine crite-
ria in deciding whom to test, they exerted a great deal of dis-
cretion. Previous special-needs cases dealing with suspicion-
less search or seizure (e.g., Skinner, 1989) have emphasized 
the importance of implementing procedures with as little dis-
cretion as possible, such as random testing. This nondiscre-
tionary approach is preferred within the public-health arena 
as well. For example, in upholding the mandatory testing of 
convicted prostitutes for AIDS, the Illinois Supreme Court 
in People v. Adams (1992) found it highly signifi cant that the 
statute afforded the court no discretion in determining whom 
to test. In contrast, Ferguson (2001) noted that respondents 
did not “point to any evidence in the record indicating that 
any of the nine search criteria was more apt to be caused 
by cocaine use than by some other factor, such as malnutri-
tion, illness, or indigency” (p. 1288, note 10). This lack of 
evidence meant that the selection criteria were fairly unsys-
tematic. The discretionary nature of the policy in Ferguson 
is characteristic of drug-screening policies applied to preg-
nant women (Logan, 1999; Roberts, 1991). Logan’s thesis is 
that this very discretion allows hospital and law enforcement 
personnel to discriminate against poor and African American 
women. A policy that mandated testing of all pregnant pa-
tients, or all pregnant patients having certain indisputable in-
dicators of cocaine use, would be less problematic. 
The Likely Effects of, and Alternatives to, 
a Ferguson-style Policy
A policy like the one implemented by MUSC, modifi ed to 
make it constitutional, would have the obvious benefi t—not to 
be underestimated—of identifying and providing treatment for 
pregnant drug users, thereby improving both their health and 
their babies’ health. No one disputes that drug use by pregnant 
women is an important public health problem with substan-
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tial social and fi nancial costs (Bell, 2001; Brody & McMil-
lin, 2001; Johnsen, 1992), many of which could be alleviated 
by such a policy. However, a Ferguson-style policy would cre-
ate some important costs as well, for both the pregnant wom-
en affected directly and society as a whole (a detailed discus-
sion of the societal costs is beyond the scope of this article). 
Thus, it is necessary to consider these costs, as well as alterna-
tives to such a policy. 
The Effects of Drug Testing During Pregnancy
A Ferguson-type policy, if successfully enacted, would 
have legal, behavioral, and clinical consequences. Legally, 
there are implications for pregnant women’s rights and the 
responsibilities of health care providers. From a behavior-
al perspective, requiring pregnant women to undergo drug 
testing could have an adverse impact on their utilization of 
services for prenatal care. Finally, such a policy could af-
fect the manner in which mental health clinicians work with 
pregnant substance abusers. 
Legal consequences. There are many instances in which 
the interests of the unborn fetus confl ict with the mother’s in-
terests (see generally Bartlett & Harris, 1998). The successful 
enactment of a policy along the lines of the one in Ferguson 
(2001) would have a number of legal ramifi cations, including 
the restriction of women’s reproductive autonomy, implica-
tions for the broader use by pregnant and nonpregnant wom-
en (and men) of legal and illegal substances, and imposing a 
higher duty on all health care providers (relating to both phys-
ical and mental health professionals), while involving them to 
a greater degree in the state’s law-enforcement purposes. 
Maternal-fetal confl ict features most prominently in the 
abortion debate, but it also appears in situations involving 
surrogate motherhood, pregnancies that jeopardize the moth-
er’s health, and, as here, pregnant women’s engagement in 
activities that are hazardous to fetal health. The central issue 
is the value to be placed on pregnant women’s autonomy and 
health, weighed against the state’s interest in protecting and 
maximizing fetal life and health (Bartlett & Harris, 1998; 
Haugaard, 1998; Johnsen, 1992). Upholding a policy simi-
lar to MUSC’s would send a clear message that in balanc-
ing the state’s interest in protecting fetal life and the preg-
nant woman’s interest in her own health and autonomy, the 
fetus’s rights trump the mother’s rights. 
Interestingly, Ferguson (2001) focuses so much on the 
Fourth Amendment aspects of the case that it completely ne-
glects another consequence of the drug-testing policy: an in-
fringement on women’s right to reproductive autonomy. The 
opinion cites none of the leading reproductive-rights cases, 
such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Roe v. Wade (1973), 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
(1992), or Stenberg v. Carhart (2000). In this context, it is 
worth noting that one of the places Griswold located wom-
en’ s right to privacy in making reproductive decisions was 
precisely in the Fourth Amendment right to be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. It would be ludicrous, 
of course, for pregnant women to claim a constitutional right 
to use illegal drugs. Nonetheless, it is not at all far fetched 
to imagine how allowing a suspicionless, warrantless, un-
consented search for illegal drugs—justifi ed by the need to 
protect maternal and fetal health—could ultimately lead to 
permitting a suspicionless, warrantless, unconsented search 
for legal drugs, such as nicotine and alcohol, that are like-
wise harmful (see, e.g., DiFranza & Lew, 1995; Finch, Vega, 
& Kolody, 2001; Streissguth, Barr, Sampson, & Bookstein, 
1994). 
In considering the plausibility of such a scenario, consider 
that in order to protect the fetus, pregnant women have been 
civilly committed, incarcerated, or forced to have cesarean 
sections against their will (Ehrenreich, 1993; Johnsen, 1992; 
Roberts, 1991). Conduct for which pregnant women have been 
punished, on grounds of harming the unborn child, includes 
drinking alcohol, prescription drug use, and negligent driving 
(Johnsen, 1992). Where does it end? Restricting or punishing 
pregnant women for behavior that is legal, albeit harmful to 
the fetus, could open the door to prosecuting women simply 
for failure to obtain “optimal” prenatal care. Testing them for 
illegal drugs is but one step along this slippery slope. 
Moreover, as Chavkin (1991) pointed out, a policy that is 
punitive toward pregnant women does not clearly serve the 
goals of either limiting fetal exposure to toxins or improving 
women’s parental functioning. Offspring can be affected by 
exposure of either parent to drugs prior to conception, through 
drugs’ effects on sperm and ova, meaning that arguably any 
drug user who plans to procreate should be prosecuted for 
child neglect. With regard to the policy’s goal of improving 
drug-abusing mothers’ postpartum functioning and treatment 
of their children, more supportive and less punitive policies 
are likely to be more effective, as described in the Alternatives 
to Punitive Policies section below. 
Involving health care personnel in testing pregnant women 
for possible prosecution expands the scope of their involve-
ment in the criminal justice system, leading to possible con-
fl icts between their duty to patients and their duty to the pub-
lic welfare (Annas, 2001). The doctor-patient relationship has 
always been treated as special, and in many ways protected, 
by the courts; involving physicians in law enforcement would 
chip away at the special nature of this relationship, undermine 
patients’ trust, and have negative repercussions on the qual-
ity of care (Annas, 2001). When only about half of pregnant 
drug users reveal their drug use to their prenatal provider as it 
is (Weir, Stark, Fleming, He, & Tesselaar, 1998), it seems that 
health care providers would want to avoid strategies making it 
even less likely for such women to share information relevant 
to the health of both mother and fetus. 
Behavioral consequences. Both sides of the Ferguson 
(2001) opinion acknowledge that a more explicit policy might 
lead some patients to feel coerced to consent in order to re-
ceive medical care and that it would inevitably lead some pa-
tients to avoid needed medical care altogether. Diminished 
prenatal care of any sort creates its own share of public health 
concerns (Bell, 2001; Brody & McMillin,  2001; Haugaard, 
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1998; Poland, Dombrowski, Ager, & Sokol, 1993), leading 
some commentators (e.g., Sovinski, 1997) to argue that “the 
lack of adequate prenatal care is more detrimental to the health 
of the developing fetus than is the mother’s use of drugs dur-
ing pregnancy” (pp. 130–131). Notably, after Whitner (1997) 
allowed criminal prosecution on child neglect charges for drug 
use during pregnancy, the number of pregnant women apply-
ing to treatment programs in South Carolina declined substan-
tially (Brody & McMillin, 2001). 
It is impossible to know whether specifi cally requiring pa-
tients’ consent to drug testing is the primary cause of any de-
crease in prenatal care, or whether other aspects of the test-
ing procedure are responsible. As discussed above, because 
the Court in Ferguson (2001), except for Justice Scalia’s dis-
sent, avoided the issue of consent, it left the door open to con-
structing similar policies with or without a consent element. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent notwithstanding, informed consent is 
such a central feature of modern medical care that it is hard 
to envision a constitutionally acceptable policy in which pa-
tients did not explicitly consent to having their urine samples 
tested for drugs. The question, then, is whether requiring such 
consent would make patients less likely to avail themselves of 
prenatal care services. Although relatively few pregnant wom-
en overall abuse illicit drugs during pregnancy (prevalence 
hovers around 5%; see Finch et al., 2001; Howell et al., 1999; 
Jewell & Russell, 2000; Lester, Boukydis, & Twomey, 2000), 
substance abuse is an important determinant of prenatal care. 
Substance abusers are less likely than nonabusers to obtain ad-
equate prenatal care (Poland, Ager, & Olson, 1987), and many 
drug-using mothers report that guilt and shame over their drug 
use is the leading reason for their avoidance of prenatal care 
(Chavkin & Paone, 1991, as cited in Chavkin, 1991). 
Poland et al. (1993) asked a sample of 142 low-in-
come women who had recently delivered how they believed 
drug-using pregnant women would behave if the law were 
changed to prosecute women who used illicit drugs dur-
ing pregnancy (no such law existed in Michigan, where the 
study took place, at the time of the study). Specifi cally, par-
ticipants were asked how they believed the law would af-
fect women’s seeking prenatal care, having a test for drug 
use, and seeking drug treatment. Approximately half of the 
participants thought that women would be less likely to get 
prenatal care or a drug test, whereas only 10% believed that 
such a policy would make these behaviors more likely (the 
remainder stated that it would make “no difference”). Simi-
larly, more participants thought that the policy would dimin-
ish, rather than increase, access to treatment. Interestingly, 
their opinions were comparable whether or not they them-
selves used drugs. Although pregnant women’s beliefs about 
a policy’s effects might not correspond perfectly to their ac-
tual behavior under the policy, these results nonetheless sug-
gest that drug testing pregnant women for a punitive purpose 
“would further alienate pregnant substance-using women 
from needed health care” (Poland et al., 1993, p. 202). 
Substance abuse is not the only factor associated with 
prenatal care utilization; a number of other factors infl u-
ence it as well (Poland et al., 1987). A recent large-scale (N 
= 2,828 mothers) study by Sable and Wilkinson (1999) found 
that women were less likely to receive adequate prenatal care 
if during pregnancy they changed living conditions or were 
homeless; had relationship problems; were arrested; were un-
able to obtain needed services, such as Aid for Families With 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Women, Infants, and Children 
(WIC), or Medicaid; or were stressed. Poland et al. (1987) ad-
dressed a somewhat different constellation of factors, but with 
similar results. They found that women were less likely to ob-
tain prenatal care if they were under- or uninsured; had a neg-
ative attitude toward their pregnancy, the importance of pre-
natal care, or health professionals in general; or were delayed 
in either suspecting pregnancy or telling others about it. 
Race and socioeconomic status are also factors: Minor-
ity and low-income women are less likely than White and 
middle-class women to receive adequate prenatal care (Jew-
ell & Russell, 2000; Mikhail, 2000). For example, Mikhail 
(2000), in interviews with 126 African American women 
with newborns, found that 13% had not received any pre-
natal care and that only 51% had received adequate prenatal 
care. Not coincidentally, minority and low-income women 
are especially likely to be subjected to discretionary drug-
testing policies during pregnancy (Roberts, 1991), which 
was true of the patients affected by MUSC’s policy as well 
(Annas, 2001; Logan, 1999). 
An analysis of these factors suggests that a policy requir-
ing consent to drug testing is especially likely to interfere with 
drug-using pregnant women’s prenatal care. Requiring consent 
is likely to magnify their guilt over using drugs (even legal ones 
widely known to harm the fetus, such as alcohol and nicotine), 
induce stress, and highlight the risk of arrest and prosecution 
should they test positive. Thus, although previous research has 
not explicitly compared the effects of requiring consent versus 
not requiring consent, there seems to be little doubt that a Fer-
guson-type policy would have a negative impact on pregnant 
substance abusers’ utilization of prenatal care. 
A public-health policy’s adverse consequences are an im-
portant consideration in balancing the policy’s public-health 
benefi ts against its invasion of patients’ privacy (Whalen v. 
Roe, 1977). Although the Court did not explicitly adopt such 
a balancing test in Ferguson (2001), it is implicit in the spe-
cial-needs analysis weighing the state’s interests against the 
patients’ protection from unreasonable search and seizure. 
Because the policy would reduce public health by deterring 
prenatal care, it would seem to lighten the scale on the side 
of the state’s special need, which consequently might not 
justify the accompanying invasion of privacy. As such, di-
minished prenatal care is an important consequence to con-
sider from the possible adoption of a policy that involves 
drug testing of pregnant women. 
Implications for clinicians and public policy. Although the 
legal implications of Ferguson (2001) are greatest for hospi-
tals and physicians, and of course the pregnant women them-
selves, Ferguson implicates the professional and legal duties 
of mental health practitioners as well. Substance use during 
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pregnancy is associated with numerous mental health prob-
lems, such as major psychopathology, a history of abuse or 
trauma, and dysfunctional family relationships (e.g., Lester et 
al., 2000). These characteristics of pregnant substance abus-
ers mean that practitioners, especially those working primar-
ily with substance abusers or young women, are likely to en-
counter women from this population. Clinicians whose focus 
is on the mental well-being of their clients might think twice 
about referring pregnant substance abusers for prenatal care 
if it entails the risk of prosecution, as prosecution is hardly a 
boon to clients’ mental health. 
Moreover, what would a clinician’s obligation be in the 
face of clear evidence of drug abuse by a pregnant client? If the 
mother herself can be found negligent for causing prenatal inju-
ry to her offspring (e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 1980), then it seems 
that under the Tarasoff (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Cal-
ifornia, 1976) duty-to-warn standard, a psychologist treating a 
pregnant woman for substance abuse could also be held negli-
gent if she knew of the risk to the unborn child and failed to re-
port it to the authorities. Thus, although the legal implications 
of Ferguson (2001) apply most directly to hospitals and physi-
cians, their mental health brethren-who are equally involved in 
diagnosing and treating substance abuse-are hardly immune. 
Alternatives to Punitive Policies
Because of the substantial costs and repercussions of prena-
tal drug use—for newborns, mothers, and society at large—it is 
important to devise methods of decreasing this hazardous be-
havior. According to Johnsen (1992), government policies for 
improving the health of newborns can be categorized as either 
“adversarial” or “facilitative.” Adversarial policies “assume that 
the government’s role is to protect the fetus from the woman,” 
whereas facilitative policies, rather than punishing women for 
their behavior, “seek to expand women’s choices by, for exam-
ple, improving access to prenatal care, food, shelter, and treat-
ment” (Johnsen, 1992, p. 571). The Ferguson (2001) policy is 
adversarial in the sense that women who fail to obtain treatment 
are liable to criminal prosecution; yet such mandatory treatment 
for drug use in general is not particularly effective (Chavkin, 
1991; Haugaard, 1998). The high likelihood of diminished pre-
natal care suggests that policies that impose mandatory treat-
ment, under threat of punishment, may not have their intended 
salutary effect. Are there better alternatives? 
A number of studies have shown that facilitative policies 
are more effective at promoting healthy pregnancies among 
drug-dependent women (Johnsen, 1992). In direct contrast to 
punitive policies, treatment programs that reward patients for 
abstinence can reliably reduce drug abuse in pregnant wom-
en (Silverman, Svikis, Robles, Stitzer, & Bigelow, 2001), al-
though the incentives must be substantial (Jones, Haug, 
Stitzer, & Svikis, 2000). Interestingly, treatment programs that 
provide enhanced prenatal care are particularly effective at re-
ducing substance abuse during pregnancy (Corse & Smith, 
1998). Because punitive policies themselves diminish utiliza-
tion of prenatal care (Poland et al., 1987), any deterrent effect 
they might exert on drug use is therefore offset by their indi-
rect effect of minimizing the ability of prenatal care to medi-
ate substance abuse treatment effects. 
Corse and Smith’s (1998) fi ndings suggest that to be effec-
tive, substance abuse treatment for pregnant women must do 
more than merely address the substance abuse itself. Several 
studies have shown that programs providing “one-stop shop-
ping” (McMurtrie, Rosenberg, Kerker, Kan, & Graham, 1999) 
are especially effective in treating this population. Such “ho-
listic” or “comprehensive” treatment programs share several 
characteristics (Comfort & Kaltenbach, 2000; Howell et al., 
1999; Lester et al., 2000; McMurtrie et al., 1999; Whiteside-
Mansell, Crone, & Conners, 1999). They
•  provide family-centered services, such as day care for old-
er children, parenting and formal educational instruction, 
and nutritional assistance; 
•  promote mothers’ self-esteem, life skills, coping, and gener-
al mental health; 
•  are community based and are culturally and linguistically 
sensitive; and
•  address other needs, such as transportation, nutrition (e.g., 
AFDC or WIC assistance), employment, and housing. 
Although these sorts of programs have not been directly 
compared with more punitive or adversarial approaches, the 
characteristics they contain are predictive of successful treat-
ment outcomes (Comfort & Kaltenbach, 2000) and exempli-
fy the facilitative approach to treating substance abuse during 
pregnancy (Johnsen, 1992). 
Testing Without Punishing: A Compromise
Obviously, for any policy to be effective, women who use 
drugs during pregnancy must fi rst be identifi ed. Because pa-
tients are often reluctant to self-report prenatal drug use (Weir 
et al., 1998), a successful policy is likely still to require a test-
ing component, in order to identify pregnant patients at risk. 
As with any other medical procedure, patients should provide 
their consent, not merely to providing a urine (or blood) spec-
imen but also to its being tested for illicit substances. The Fer-
guson (2001) decision seems to entail also informing patients 
that positive test results will be turned over to the authorities, 
but requiring patients to consent explicitly to possible pros-
ecution is unlikely to enhance their continued utilization of 
prenatal care (Poland et a1., 1993). 
Rather, for such a policy to serve the health needs of both 
mother and child, patients should explicitly be told that posi-
tive test results will not entail the chance of prosecution. Be-
cause such a policy would have a more clearly therapeutic 
than law-enforcement purpose, it would be consistent with 
the sort of acceptable policy outlined by Justice Kennedy in 
his Ferguson (2001) concurrence. In addition, it would facili-
tate patients’ access to both prenatal care and substance abuse 
treatment, and it would not pit the interests and responsibil-
ities of patients and providers against each other. Under this 
procedure, testing could be allowed, and most importantly, at-
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risk patients could be identifi ed for interventions without de-
terring them from needed prenatal care. 
Conclusion
Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2001) is an important case 
in the family law domain because MUSC’s policy of testing 
pregnant women for illegal drugs raises issues at the intersec-
tion of public health and constitutional law. The public-health 
aspects concern the very real and signifi cant risks to maternal, 
fetal, and societal well-being of drug use during pregnancy; in 
addition, the policy raises constitutional questions about what 
constitutes a reasonable search and seizure and women’ s pri-
vacy right to reproductive autonomy. Ultimately, the case ad-
dresses how best to strike the sometimes competing interests 
between mothers and their unborn children. 
Although the policy was discontinued before the Supreme 
Court’s ruling and the Court held the policy to be unconstitu-
tional, all the components of the decision—majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions—point to ways in which a sim-
ilar policy could be designed so as to avoid the constitutional 
pitfalls encountered by the policy in Ferguson (2001). The 
petitioners won, but their victory is likely to be short lived. 
Recent developments in a number of states, combined with 
ongoing public concern about drug abuse, especially by preg-
nant women, suggest that despite Ferguson’s outcome, preg-
nant women should not feel too secure from state intervention 
when receiving prenatal care. Such interventions are like-
ly to have signifi cant consequences for pregnant women’s le-
gal rights, as well as for their health, their fetuses’ health, and 
their behavior during pregnancy. 
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